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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
DEAD OR ALIVE: PROTECTING ACTORS IN THE AGE OF
VIRTUAL REANIMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, September 19, 2004, the movie Sky Captain and the
World of Tomorrow1 ("Sky Captain") opened number one at the box office,
taking in a total of sixteen million dollars for the weekend.2 The opening
was notable not because of the relatively modest box office total, but
because this stylish, almost totally computer-generated movie includes
scenes performed by Sir Laurence Olivier, a celebrity actor who has been
dead since 1989.3 While audiences are used to seeing living actors placed
alongside dead celebrities in films, 4 commercials, 5 and music videos, 6 Sky
Captain marks the first time a dead actor's reanimated clone7 performs
completely original scenes-scenes the actor never performed when he or
she was alive.8 Sky Captain showcases the latest step in the technological
push toward what some call the "holy grail" 9 of reanimation-"virtual
1. SKY CAPTAIN AND THE WORLD OF TOMORROW (Paramount Pictures 2004).
2. See Gabriel Snyder, "Sky" High at $16 Mil; Bernie Mac Pic Leads Sports Contenders,
DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 19, 2004.
3. See Stuart Klawans, Ideas & Trends: Dead Stars, Alive Again; Yes, Marilyn May Fall in
Love With Viggo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, § 4 at 4.
4. See Jol A. Silversmith, Photographic Evidence, Naked Children, and Dead Celebrities:
Digital Forgery and the Law, Part III (Apr. 1998), at
http://www.thirdamendment.com/celebrities.html; see also Woody Allen's ZELIG (Orion Pictures
1983).
5. See id. (citing Carl Reiner's DEAD MEN DON'T WEAR PLAID (Universal 1982)); see also
Kevin Goldman, Dead Celebrities Are Resurrected As Pitchmen, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1994, at B 1
(citing advertising commercials featuring Humphrey Bogart for khaki trousers; Louis Armstrong,
James Cagney, and Carey Grant for Diet Coke).
6. See Silversmith, supra note 4 (listing music videos in which digital clones have been
used).
7. For the purposes of this article, the terms virtual human, reanimated clone, synthespian,
and virtual clone all refer to the computer-generated model of a person's identifiable image or
persona.
8. See Klawans, supra note 3.
9. See Frederick Rose, Who Needs Actors? Computers May One Day Create Believable
Characters. But They Aren't There Yet., WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1995 at R8 ("[R]ight now that
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humans who can see, speak, hear, touch and be touched, exhibit behavior,
and think just as we do."'10
The fact is that virtual actors have been around for two decades.
Marilyn Monroe was the first celebrity synthespian" in the 1987
independent film Rendezvous in Montreal.12 More recently, Tom Hanks
interacted with John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon, John Lennon, and George
Wallace in Forrest Gump.13  Audiences have seen virtual humans as
terrified passengers in Titanic14 and as victims in Jurassic Park.15 In the
latter film, actor Robert Patrick's digital clone, which debuted as the liquid
metal cyborg in Terminator 2: Judgment Day,
16 doubled as T-Rex's meal. 17
Digital technology has made it possible to watch Elton John acting with
James Cagney, Humphrey Bogart, and Louis Armstrong for Diet Coke; 18
Paula Abdul sharing a Coca-Cola with Cary Grant; 19 John Wayne selling
Coors beer; 20and Steve McQueen driving the 2005 Ford Mustang.21 Virtual
actors are also used everyday in non-entertainment activities such as
medical research, 22  anti-terrorism training, 23  and others-only the
imagination limits the possibilities.
24
holy grail is the digital actor and digital creature.").
10. Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of
the Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 441, 444 (2001).
11. See generally Karen Kaplan, Old Actors Never Die; They Just Get Digitized, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1999 (defining the term "synthospian"); see also THE WORD Spy, Synthespian, at
http://www.wordspy.com/words/synthespian.asp.
12. See Klawans, supra note 3 (noting that the short film featured digital versions of
Marilyn Monroe and Humphrey Bogart).
13. See David Einstein, Computers Transform Tinseltown, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 1995, at
Bl.
14. See Beard, supra note 10, at 446.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Silversmith, supra note 4; see generally Denise Gellene, TV Spots Feature Dead
Celebrities, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at 53 (covering the general trend of using dead
celebrities as "pitchmen").
19. See Silversmith, supra note 4.
20. See Gellene, supra note 18.
21. See Jeremy Peters & Danny Hakim, Advertising: Is that Steve McQueen in the
Cornfield? Yes, Brought Back by Ford., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at C3.
22. See Chua Gim Guan et. al., Volume-based Tumor Neurosurgery Planning in the Virtual
Workbench, Symposium, PROCEEDINGS, IEEE VIRTUAL REALITY INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
167 (1998) (describing how the Singapore General and John Hopkins Hospital uses virtual reality
when planning surgeries); see also the website for MOTEK, a company specializing in motion
capture technology in the medical field, at http://www.e-motek.com/medical/index.htm.
23. See Beard, supra note 10, at 446.
24. See id. at 447.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
When the technology matures, it may become impossible to
distinguish the authorized audio-visual representations of actors from their
potentially unauthorized virtual clones. 25 If so, it is not difficult to predict
the range of unauthorized shenanigans that may be possible.26 After all,
there are advantages to employing virtual actors: they show up on time,
perform any kind of scene (including pornography)
27 without complaint,28
they cannot sue, require no rest, and are always available to perform.
Additionally, synthespians can perform dangerous stunts that would kill a
living actor,29 and if an actor dies during production, his or her virtual
stand-in can finish the movie.3°
The legal system has historically "reacted to, rather than anticipated"
technological innovation. 31  Reanimation raises legal issues that pre-
existing case law does not adequately address. Therefore, it is critical to
the preservation of actors' dignity, as well as their income, to develop legal
safeguards that will protect them-dead or alive. This comment will focus
on human actors' rights,32 and analyze the legal implications the digital
world imposes upon them. Part II will generally describe the historical
development of the law that has been applied to actors' issues: right of
publicity law, copyright law, the fair use doctrine, and the Lanham Act.
Part III will analyze and compare the lines of legal arguments regarding
25. Id. at 529 (stating that eventually imaginary virtual humans will be indistinguishable
from visual and audio representations of real humans, such that they will pass the "Turing Test").
26. See Erin Giacoppo, Note, Avoiding the Tragedy of Frankenstein: The Application of the
Right of Publicity to the Use of Digitally Reproduced Actors in Film, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 601, 626
(1997).
27. See Joseph D. Schleimer, Problems Encountered in Protecting Living and Deceased
Actors' 'Virtual Rights', 16 ENT. L. & FIN. 1, 6 (Oct. 2000) (contemplating an adult film starring
the virtual clones of John F. Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe), available at
http://www.schleimerlaw.com/ELF2Synthespians.htm.
28. See Dave Kehr, The Face That Launched a Thousand Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004,
§ 2, at 1 (describing how virtual actors will never be in their trailers, are always in character,
eliminate the risk and bother of working with child actors, and a director doesn't have to "stand
there in front of the actor and convince him to do it your way").
29. See Paula Parisi, Shot by an Outlaw, WIRED, Sept. 1996, at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.09/billups.html.
30. See Joseph D. Schleimer, Part 11. Aggressive Lawyering to Protect the "Virtual Rights"
of Living and Deceased Actors, 16 ENT. L. & FIN. (Feb. 2001) (recounting how an entire
computer-generated scene was created when Oliver Reed died during production of GLADIATOR),
at http://www.schleimerlaw.com/Synthespiansll.htm; Silversmith, supra note 4, (stating that
"[d]igital imagery reputedly saved the 1994 film THE CROW, after its star, Brandon Lee was
killed" during filming); see also Giacoppo, supra note 26, at 607.
31. Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call At Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of Deceased
Entertainers-A 21st Century Challenge For Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 101,
106 (1993).
32. Human actors are living or deceased actors, as compared to silicon-based computer-
generated "virtual" actors.
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actors' rights, focusing particularly on the constitutional issues of the right
of publicity, the commercial versus noncommercial issue, and the
balancing tests courts have used in their decisions. Part IV will critique the
effectiveness of the current law when applied to virtual clones and make
three suggestions for the protection of actors: (1) an actor should be
considered an "entire performance," according to Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting, Co. 33; (2) a virtual clone should be considered a
hybrid legal concept under current law, because a virtual clone removes the
idea/expression dichotomy and contains principles from both copyright and
right of publicity in inextricable combination; and (3) a complex, multi-
factored balancing test, which borrows from the fair use doctrine, is
suggested for analyzing the multitude of issues that will arise in cases
involving virtual actors. Part V will conclude that new preemptive federal
law will probably be necessary in order to consistently protect actors in the
virtual age.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. The Right of Publicity is the Offspring of the Right of Privacy
1. The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy is generally credited to the seminal article written
by Professors Warren and Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law
Review in 1890.34 New York enacted the first right to privacy statute35 as a
reaction to the 1902 case Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, Co.36 In
Roberson, the New York Court of Appeals considered the professors'
proposition, but held that a common law right to privacy would result in a
"vast amount of litigation.., bordering upon the absurd., 37 Other courts
33. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (citing the only Supreme
Court case dealing with, and supporting, a performer's right of publicity).
34. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) (offering the first clear argument for a distinct right to privacy). See generally 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 8:74 (2d ed. 2003);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 652A (1977); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (establishing a self-
executing right of privacy: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
35. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2002).
36. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (establishing
criminal liability and civil liability with injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief).
37. Id. at 443.
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have generally interpreted the common law right of privacy narrowly as the
protection of dignitary and emotional interests-"the right to be let
alone. 38 By 1960, however, the "right of privacy had evolved into four
distinct categories of invasion, as identified by Dean Prosser: (1) intrusion
upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3)
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4)
appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or
likeness."
39
2. The Right of Publicity
Dean Prosser's fourth category above-the theory of
misappropriation-spawned the "right of publicity, ' 4° and established the
"inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his
or her identity."41  A separate, cognizable right of publicity was first
recognized by the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories., Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc. 42 The following year, in a highly influential article,
Melville Nimmer 43 argued that laws of privacy, unfair competition, and
contract were inadequate to protect the commercial interests of a celebrity's
persona," and he urged courts and legislatures to adopt the right of
publicity that Haelan enumerated.45 Since Haelan, although some courts
have focused on the protection of "dignitary" rights,46 case law and statutes
have focused almost exclusively on the commercial interest of the right's
holder. "[C]ases... held that a celebrity has a publicity interest in her
likeness, allowing her to recover when companies publish advertisements
that include her picture,47 voice,48 or an image intended to evoke the
38. See Scott Jon Shagin & Matthew Savare, The Right of Publicity: Bailing the Haystack,
in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 641, 647 (Practising Law Inst. ed. 2004).
39. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Screen Actors Guild, Inc., at 3, Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960)).
40. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (recognizing the
right of publicity as a separate and distinct commercial tort).
41. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed.
2004).
42. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
43. Melville B. Nirnmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
44. Id. at 204.
45. See Nimmer, supra note 43.
46. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296
S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) (holding it was immaterial whether the owner commercially exploited
King's image prior to King's death).
47. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Right of Publicity in Digitally Produced Images: How
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identity of the celebrity. 49 Thus, misappropriation, embodied in right of
publicity legislation, has commonly been recognized as an intellectual
property right.5
B. Right of Publicity Laws Are Governed by the States
"There is no federal right of publicity and no likelihood of enactment
of such legislation in the near term."5 Publicity laws are creations of state
governments, and they exist in twenty-eight states, as common law,
statutory law, or both.52 Doctrinally, right of publicity laws are a
"disjunctive morass," because "[t]he state of the law is still that of a
haystack in a hurricane., 53 In other words, the law is literally all over the
map. For example, "[s]ome states consider the right of publicity to be a
property type right," while "others regard it as a personal tort type right"
54
stemming from the right to privacy. New York, most notably, does not
expressly recognize the right of publicity, but incorporates it as a privacy
right within its civil rights law.55
1. Statutory law
The eighteen states that have enacted statutory protection differ on the
extent of the protection, its descendability, the duration of any postmortem
protection, its application to non-celebrities, and the available remedies for
violations. 6 For example, Indiana offers the broadest right of publicity
the First Amendment Is Being Used to Pick Celebrities' Pockets, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 3
(2002) (citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1998)).
48. Id. (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988), where the court
allowed "recovery for use in commercial of 'sound-alike' rendition of song [Midler] had
recorded").
49. Id. (citing White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)).
50. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 649; see, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001) (stating that the right of publicity is essentially an
economic right, and the right to prevent others from misappropriating the economic value
generated by the celebrity's fame through the merchandising of the "'name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness' of the celebrity"); see also Hessick, supra note 47, at 9.
51. Beard, supra note 10, at 516.
52. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 641.
53. Id. at 641 (citing Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956)).
54. Id. at 646.
55. Id.
56. Statutory right of publicity is recognized in the following states: California (CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344-3344.1 (West 2004)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2002)), Illinois
(765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1 (West 2002)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (Michie
2002)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 2001)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. CH. 214, § 3A (West 2002)), Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-201 (Michie
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protection; its statute protects a personality's economic interest in his name,
voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance,
gestures, or mannerisms. 57 California limits its protection to unauthorized
usage of name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.5 8  It is also
interesting to note that many states' right of publicity statutes, like
California's, exempt use in film, and hence, do not apply to motion
pictures.59 Kentucky limits its right of publicity protection to unauthorized
appropriations of name and likeness, 60 while New York protects against the
unauthorized use of name, portrait, picture, or voice. However, as
mentioned previously, New York's right of publicity protection is
incorporated within its civil rights law.6 '
.2. Common Law
Common law right of publicity protection is generally more
expansive than state statutory law. In White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., 62 for example, the defendant created advertising for its
electronics products that featured a robot dressed similarly to Vanna
White 63 standing next to a game board that resembled the Wheel of Fortune
board, with a caption, "Longest-running Game Show. 2012 A.D." 64 The
Ninth Circuit Court ultimately affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
2002)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.770 (Michie 2002)), New York (N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS
LAW § 50 (McKinney 2002)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.01 (Anderson 2000)),
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 839.1 (West 2001)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
1-28.1 (Michie 2001)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1101 (2001)), Texas (TEx. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 26.001 (Vernon 2000)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-1 (2002)), Virginia (VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 2002)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010 (West
2002)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 2001)). Shagin & Savare, supra note
38, at 641 n.2.
Common law right of publicity is recognized in the following states: Arizona, Alabama,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id. n. 1.
The states that recognize both a statutory and common law right of publicity are: California,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id. n.3.
57. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (Michie 2002).
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344-3344.1 (West 2004).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (statute covering deceased celebrites exempts film);
Gerald 0. Sweeney, Jr. & John T. Williams, Mortal Kombat: The Impact of Digital Technology
on the Rights of Studios and Actors to Images and Derivative Works, 17 No.1 ENT. & SPORTS
LAWYER. 1, 20 (1999) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2004)).
60. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 2004).
61. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2002).
62. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 1396 (referring to the game-show hostess).
64. Id.
2005]
162 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:155
statutory right of publicity claim, but upheld White's common law claim,
saying "[i]t is not important how the defendant has appropriated the
plaintiff's identity, but whether the defendant has done so. ''65 Similarly,
Johnny Carson 66 sued the maker and marketer of portable toilets dubbed
"Here's Johnny: The World's Foremost Commodian," claiming that the
usage appropriated his signature Tonight Show 67 greeting without his
68 Sxpermission. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that it
was a violation of Mr. Carson's common law right of publicity. Other
courts have held that the unauthorized use of a nickname,69 character
name, 70 and even a recognizable race car71 that was associated with a
specific driver (even though the driver was not shown) held substantial
enough identification value to be a violation of a celebrity's right to
publicity under common law right of publicity.
3. Postmortem Protection
Thirteen states, including California, have expressly recognized the
descendability of the right of publicity,72 but other states, such as New
York, have rejected postmortem protection. The duration of the protection
differs substantially among the states that have adopted statutory
postmortem protection. For example, Tennessee's statute permits
executors, heirs, assigns, or devisees to maintain the exclusive right for a
period of ten years after the person's death; after this period, the right
extends indefinitely provided the use continues.73 Oklahoma's statute,
however, extends the right for one hundred years after death,74 whereas
California's postmortem protection is for seventy years.75 No term under
common law protection has been defined, although a term equal to
65. Id. at 1398 (emphasis in original).
66. Previous host of the NBC talk show, which now stars Jay Leno.
67. id.
68. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983).
69. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 140 (Wis. 1979).
70. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1994).
71. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
72. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3341.1 (Deering Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1)(c)
(West 2001); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1075/30(b) (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-
8 (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-208
(Michie 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790 (Michie 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2741.02 (Anderson 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-25-1104 (2000); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012-13 (Vernon 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01 -
40 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.040 (West 2005).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2000).
74. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (West 1993).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering Supp. 2005).
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copyright protection has been suggested.76 The result is that where an actor
lives and/or dies determines the legal implications of each case, which
highlights the inconsistency in right of publicity law. 7
C. Copyright Law
The United States Constitution provides copyright protection by
granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 78  The
underlying rationale is to encourage the production of works of authorship
for the benefit of the public79 while also encouraging individual creation for
personal gain.80 The Copyright Act of 197681 defines copyrightable
material as "original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device." 82 "Original," in the copyright context,
means only that the work was independently created by the author and that
it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity, but that requisite
level of creativity can be extremely low. 83 Copyright protection of original
works, therefore, "extends from the moment the creative work becomes
fixed in a tangible form,"84 but protects only the "unique components of the
author's original work., 85  The protection does not extend to "any
76. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 446-47 (Cal. 1979).
77. See generally Joseph J. Beard, Fresh Flowers For Forest Lawn: Amendment of the
California Post-Mortem Right of Publicity Statute, 17 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 23 (2000)
(discussing choice of law implications of postmortem protections); see, e.g., Beard, supra note
10, at 517 (discussing choice of law clauses, and three approaches different jurisdictions have
taken to the issue of which law determines the status of a postmortem right of publicity).
78. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
79. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2004).
80. See Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992)
("[C]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."); Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (noting that "copyright
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work").
81. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 (2000).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
83. NIMMER, supra note 79, § 2.01[B].
84. Christina M. Reger, Let's Swap Copyright for Code. The Computer Software Disclosure
Dichotomy, 24 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 215, 223 (2004); see 17 U.S.C. § 102.
85. See Ira. J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away From Me: Protecting Free Trade in
Public Images From Right of Publicity Claims, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 37,45 (1997); 17 U.S.C. §
102(a).
20051
164 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:155
[underlying] idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied., 86  Thus, copyright
infringement analysis requires the determination of two things: (1) the
distinction between an idea and an "expression of an idea," and (2) the
point at which another expression is substantially similar enough to trigger
a violation of an author's copyright in the original work.87
Copyright law does not protect ideas, irrespective of the form in
which they are embodied; it protects the expression of ideas. 8  For
example, a photograph can be copyrighted, but the model (or unfixed
object of the photograph), which is more akin to an idea, cannot be
copyrighted.8 9 Whereas right of publicity law is focused on a person's
identity or persona and protects identification elements such as name,
likeness, voice, and picture,90 copyright law is focused on the recorded,
creative expression and authorship of those identification elements.9' Thus,
a human being is not copyrightable, though photographs, sculptures, or
motion pictures of the person are copyrightable. 92 A human voice is not
copyrightable, but fixation of that voice in a sound recording is
copyrightable.93 Reanimation, however, takes us into uncharted legal
territory and correct analysis is crucial, because the "essence of the living
object upon which the expression was based remains outside the reach of
copyright law, [but] [flight of publicity law.., makes people's images into
'things.'94
1. Fair Use Doctrine in Copyright Law
The judicial doctrine of fair use was described and endorsed, but not
defined, in the Copyright Act of 1976. 95 The Senate bill embodied express
statutory recognition that the "fair use" of a copyrighted work is not an
infringement of copyright.96 The doctrine attempts to establish a "balance
between the interests of the creators of works, and the interests of the
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
87. See Beard, supra note 10, at 539 (stating the test for copyright infringement is whether
the purportedly infringing use is substantially similar to the original).
88. See Beard, supra note 31, at 137.
89. See Kaplan, supra note 85, at 44-45.
90. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344-3344.1 (West 2004).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
92. See Beard, supra note 10, at 530.
93. See id.
94. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 45.
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
96. Id.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
public that would make their own use of them, through fair use. 97 The
doctrine is one of the most important and well-established limitations on
the exclusive right of copyright owners, but since it is an equitable and
reasonable rule, no generally applicable definition is possible,98 nor was
one intended. 99 The bill goes no further than expressing a very broad
statutory explanation of what fair use is by endorsing the principle that
courts must be free to adapt and apply the doctrine on a case-by-case
basis.'00
The policy behind the doctrine is to allow "the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."'' The language used,
"reproductions in copies or phonorecords," was not intended to specify
particular usages that are exempted but to give examples of the types of
usages that should be considered under the doctrine. 10 2 The language, "or
by any other means," anticipated that there would be future technologies,
such as digital works, to be reckoned with. To determine if there is a
copyright infringement, courts apply a balancing test based on four non-
definitive, non-determinative factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the
use [of the copyrighted work], including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."1
03
97. See Silversmith, supra note 4, at Part. III.C. (citing Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law
and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of
Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 392 (1995), which states that
"copyright doctrine mediates public interest in the production of information and the public
interest in access to information").
98. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ("The bill endorses the purpose and general scope
of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute,
especially during a period of rapid technological change").
99. Id. (stressing that "the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances
that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute").
100. Id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
and Harper i& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (showing the
controversy that can result from applying the generalized balancing test based on the four
factors).
101. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (stating that the references to photocopying and
phonorecords are to be interpreted as examples of technologies, and not meant to be specific,
ensuring that fair use is forward-thinking and anticipatory of new reproducing technologies).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 65.
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"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts. '" '1 4 However, digital works may make fair use even more difficult to
determine because the doctrine could not have anticipated digital works,
including virtual actors, which are so inherently transformable, duplicable,
and transferable.' 0 5  Also, just as with digital audio sampling, 10 6 digital
visual works can be a compilation of numerous copyrightable works, each
one of which may not be an individual violation under the fair use
doctrine.10 7 Thus, courts may be reluctant to quash digital technology's
limitless potential for generating new works.108 However, infringement
judgments about original works involving virtual actors will be more
difficult to make'0 9 because the issue will turn first on which party owns
the intermediate digital clone of an actor and/or the virtual actor's
performance in a new work."10 In any case, courts will be thrust ever
deeper into the business of making artistic decisions, the prospect of which
Justice Holmes admonished that jurists are ill-suited to judge the worth of
artistic works."'
104. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
105. See Silversmith, supra note 4, Part III.C.; see, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1990) (analyzing the
"muddled" statute, and its "three considerably inconsistent ways of doing nothing").
106. See Silversmith, supra note 4, Part III.C (citing Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros.
Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); see also Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th
Cir. 2003) (describing sampling and its factors); Bridgeport Music, Inc v. Dimension Films, 383
F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (adding other analytical issues associated with sampling, including
fragmented literal similarity).
107. See generally Italian Book Corp. v. American Broad. Co. Inc., 458 F. Supp. 65, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussing the issue of "fortuitousness" in copyright and fair use); see also 4
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][3] (2004)
(discussing substantial similarity).
108. See Silversmith, supra note 4, Part III.C. (addressing recent court decisions and the
reluctance to completely deny the right to generate digital works).
109. See Weinreb, supra note 105, at 1139.
110. See Silversmith, supra note 4, at n.903 (citing Jonathan A. Franklin, Digital Image
Reproduction, Distribution, and Protection: Legal Remedies and Industrywide Alternatives, 10
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 347, 372 (1999).
111. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
2. Copyright Protection for Characters
Even though the Copyright Act is silent on the issue, characters
contained in a written work such as a novel or play have had a difficult
time gaining copyright protection. 1 2  In fact, characters are generally
considered "to be contributions to the copyright protected work as a
whole."'"13  Characters within a visual medium, however, "change[]
everything."' 1 4 Animated characters such as E.T.,' 15 puppets,' 6 and even
characters played by more than one human such as James Bond," 7 have
been protected, while other decisions have not found the threshold level of
character development sufficient to bestow copyright protection. At least
one commentator has suggested that "a celebrity is as much a fictional
character as Superman or Sam Spade" because characters "can take on a
life beyond the works in which they are depicted." '" 8 Thus, these decisions
are discretionary and courts have used various approaches in their analyses.
3. Copyright Versus Actors' Right of Publicity Regarding Fictional
Characters
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc.," 9 the Ninth Circuit had to decide
if animatronic figures of Cheers'20 characters Norm and Cliff, featured in
the defendant's Cheers-themed airport bars, were substantially similar
enough to constitute likenesses of actors George Wendt and John
Ratzenberger. 12  Paramount Pictures owns all copyrights from the
television series and had licensed the characters to Host International, but
Wendt and Ratzenberger, who created the characters, sued under
112. Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 657-58; see, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954). But see Burroughs v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that the character of Tarzan was sufficiently developed in the written works of Edgar Rice
Burroughs to gain copyright protection).
113. Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 657.
114. Id. at 658.
115. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. J.A.R. Sales Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679, 683
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
116. See generally Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
117. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
118. See Silversmith, supra note 4, Part III.C.
119. Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), en banc denied, 197
F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999).
120. Cheers (NBC 1982-1993).
121. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811.
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California's right of publicity law. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court's summary judgment for the defendant and held that whether the
animatronic figures were likenesses was a question for the jury to decide.'
22
The case eventually was settled out of court, but of note was Judge
Kozinski's dissent, in which he stated that right of publicity and copyright
are the same in that they are both controlled by section 301 of the
Copyright Act. 123  He stated the robots were derivatives of the show
containing copyright-protected characters.12 4 The Wendt majority found a
potential infringement of a celebrity's persona when it is associated with a
fictional character, 25 particularly when the character is being used
primarily to sell products and the possibility of the perception of a false
endorsement exists.126 Conversely, and in illustration of the crazy-quilt
variety of judicial decisions that show the unpredictable nature of the law
associated with actors' rights, 2 7 the Ninth Circuit, in Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 28 reversed the district court and held that Dustin
Hoffman's right of publicity had not been violated when a magazine used
unauthorized images of Hoffman as Tootsie' 29 in a multi-page fashion
pictorial. 3  Even though the pictorial was accompanied by very little
editorial comment and Hoffman's and other celebrity images were
admittedly used to sell magazines, the Ninth Circuit held it was protected
by the First Amendment.
1 31
Thus, even though the "right of publicity grew out of the right of
privacy," courts have interpreted the law to be a "sui generis mixture of
122. Id. at 814.
123. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
124. Id. at 1286.
125. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810 (stating that appellants here are not seeking to prevent
Paramount from exhibiting its copyrighted work in the Cheers series, and their "claims are not
preempted by the federal copyright statute so long as they 'contain elements, such as the invasion
of personal rights... that are different in kind from copyright infringement').
126. Id. at 812.
127. See, e.g., Gerald 0. Sweeney, Jr. & John T. Williams, Mortal Kombat: The Impact of
Digital Technology on the Rights of Studios and Actors to Images and Derivative Works, 17 ENT.
& SPORTS L. 1 (1999); see also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the athlete's name and accomplishments were used in unauthorized television
advertisements for Oldsmobile); White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding a robot resembling the TV hostess to be a violation of her right of publicity). But
see Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that using an
unauthorized image from Tootsie was not a violation of the actor's right of publicity and Mr.
Hoffman could not show actual malice).
128. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
129. TOOTSIE (Columbia Pictures 1982).
130. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1189.
131. Id. at 1186.
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personal rights, property rights, and rights under unfair competition.
''i1
For reasons subsequently discussed, reanimation will almost certainly add
another layer of complication to an already inconsistent judicial landscape.
D. Unfair Competition and the Lanham Act
"Fame is valued,' 33 and the Lanham Act of 1946 protects personas as
well as ordinary trademarks attached to goods by providing federal claims
for unfair competition and false advertising. 34 The Act provides a right of
action to persons engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, for deceptive
and misleading usages of words, names, symbols, or devices, or any
combination thereof, which are likely to deceive consumers as to the
association, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services by another
person.135 In a Lanham Act action, "mark means the celebrity's persona"
or identity and "the strength of mark refers to the level of recognition the
celebrity enjoys" for purposes of determining whether a defendant's
challenged conduct caused a likelihood of confusion about a celebrity's
endorsement of a product. 136 The test is whether the celebrity's image in a
product's advertising is likely to mislead the public about the celebrity's
"sponsorship or approval of the product or service."' 137 The Ninth Circuit
in Wendt, for example, employed a "well settled eight factor test" to be
applied to celebrity endorsement cases. 138  The test requires the
consideration of "(1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2) relatedness of
the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7)
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; [and] (8) likelihood of expansion
of the product lines."'
139
132. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 953 (6th Cir. 2003).
133. See John Gibeaut, Image Conscious, 85-Jun A.B.A. J. 46, 47 (June 1999) (quoting
Mark. S. Lee, attorney for the estates of Elvis Presley and Britain's Princess Diana).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (which is the amendment of section 42(a) of the
Lanham Act of 1946); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b
(1995) (noting that "celebrities are not precluded from establishing cognizable injury to personal
interests in addition to commercial loss, nor are less well-known plaintiffs precluded from
establishing commercial loss in addition to injury to personal interests ... .
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
136. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812 n.1 (citing White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992).
137. ETWCorp., 99 F.3d at 925-26.
138. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812 (citing Newton v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994)
and noting that "appellants would have a claim if 'Host's conduct had created a likelihood of
confusion as to whether plaintiffs were endorsing Host's product. "').
139. Id.; cf. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448-450 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
"likelihood of confusion" test and adopting the equally ambiguous Rogers test from Rogers v.
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The "likelihood of confusion" standard for unfair competition
provided by the Lanham Act is "predominantly factual in nature," and
"[s]ummary judgment is inappropriate when a jury could reasonably
conclude that most of the factors weigh in the plaintiffs favor."'
140
"[W]hether a claim is brought under § 1114 for infringement of an
registered mark, or whether it is brought under § 1125(a) for infringement
of an unregistered mark, the touchstone of the claim is likelihood of
confusion."'14 1 But, each court has formulated its own balancing test based
on different, and seemingly overlapping, legal theories.
142
Reanimation will likely complicate this issue even further. For
example, Lanham Act violations regarding actors have heretofore involved
celebrity endorsers143 who have established commercial value in the
marketplace. But hypothetically, if a non-celebrity actor with negligible
bargaining power signs over her reanimation rights to a producer as a
mandatory term of an employment contract and subsequently becomes a
celebrity based on her digital clone's performance(s), the public may
incorrectly assume that she has approved endorsements in any future
performances by her virtual clone. However, assuming the producer owns
the copyrighted virtual clone, under current law it may not be clear what
the source-actor's rights are when her virtual clone gives subsequent
unauthorized performances. 44 There may be no clearly defined legal
protection for source-actors' (especially non-celebrity actors) economic or
dignitary interests against what are actually, if not legally, subsequent false
endorsements by their copyrighted virtual clones. Also, some producers
may consider any potential damages to be an affordable cost of doing
business regardless of the harm to the actor's reputation or value. In
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989), which interpreted a Lanham Act violation to be only
when the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression).
140. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812 (citing Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407,
413 (9th Cir. 1996).
141. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 940.
142. Compare ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 915 (rejecting the eight factor test and adopting a
two-prong test based on Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)), with Wendt, 125 F.3d
at 806 (employing the eight factor test), and Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with Judge Kozinski's dissent in White v. Samsung
Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Ci. 1992), affirming the district court's ruling that
trading cards were expression protected by the First Amendment).
143. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 925 (defining a "celebrity endorser" as a celebrity
associated with a product).
144. See generally Jordan Tabach-Bank, Missing the Right of Publicity Boat: How Tyne v.
Time Warner Entertainment Co. Threatens to "Sink" the First Amendment, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 247, 252-61 (2004) (describing the various right of publicity and privacy violations
involving both celebrities and non-celebrities).
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essence, this results in unjust enrichment for the producer, which borders
on de facto virtual economic and dignitary slavery. 145  In any case, the
result for source-actors may be a permanent inability to control and exploit
their own careers, including their inability to control the process of
becoming a celebrity and/or the type of celebrity they desire to become.
III. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE LAW
A. The Technology
There are two basic technological approaches to creating a silicon-
based virtual actor: the direct approach and the indirect approach. 146 One
method of direct approach employs a scanning process called "performance
capture. 147  In this method, infrared cameras are placed all around the
source-actor 148 to digitally capture his full body motion and/or facial
expressions during his performance. The cameras record the light
bouncing back from several dozen infrared sensors placed all over the
source-actor's face and body suit. 149 The source-actor generally performs
in front of a solid blue (or green) background.1 50  The digital, three-
dimensionally-captured performance then becomes the "human
blueprint" 15 -the virtual actor-which can be "realistically placed in any
kind of computer-generated environment the filmmakers can dream up.,,'
152
For example, Tom Hanks' digitally recorded persona was used in the
creation of five different characters' 53 in the computer-generated, animated
movie The Polar Express.154  The scanning technology in The Polar
Express is the latest improvement over that used to capture actor Andy
145. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude.., shall
exist within the Untied States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
146. See Beard, supra note 10, at 448-49.
147. See Kehr, supra note 28.
148. As used herein, the term "source-actor" means a human performer or actor, living or
dead, who is the source for the virtual clone.
149. See Kehr, supra note 28.
150. See id. (referring to blue-screen work); see also Krista Smith, Rule of Law, VANITY
FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 305 (Jude Law shot all of his action in Sky Captain in front of a blue screen).
151. See Kenneth Turan, A Bumpy, Noisy Ride: Robert Zemeckis' Visually Striking 'Polar
Express'Pumps Up a Classic Children's Book, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at E6.
152. Id.
153. Glenn Whipp, Tom Hanks, Version 2.0; Actor Teams Up with Robert Zemeckis and
Cutting-Edge Technology to Bring 'Polar Express' to the Screen, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 19,
2004, at E5; see also Peter Biskind, Express to the Future, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 220.
154. THE POLAR EXPRESS (Warner Bros. 2004). See Kehr, supra note 28.
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Serkis' performance of Gollum in Lord of the Rings.155 The blue-screen
process was also used with Jude Law, Gwyneth Paltrow, and the other
living actors in Sky Captain,156 except that the intention in this film was to
exploit the celebrities' recognizable star personas rather than distorting
them into animated characters. Thus, the actors in Sky Captain performed
in front of a blue screen, wearing costumes (instead of the blue or black suit
or the reflectors), 57 and their conventionally captured performances were
then digitally placed into computer-generated settings for each scene.
158
Computer-generated imagery ("CGI") technology is also extensively used
in the creation of video games such as the newly released Sims 2.159
The indirect approach, used when a dead celebrity is involved, entails
creating the deceased actor's virtual clone from existing conventional
reference material, such as photographs, sculptures, or movie clips.
160
Photogrammetry, for example, is a technique that compares common points
in two photographs taken at different angles in order to calculate a three-
dimensional coordinate.' 61 Another technique employs a sculpted bust of
an actor which is then digitally scanned to produce a three-dimensional
computer model. 62 A third technique is direct computer sculpting, where
an artist-animator, while looking at reference material, uses electronic input
devices to visually sculpt the image onto the computer screen. 163 Once a
digital bust of the identifiable elements (primarily the face and hair) is
created, human-movement-tracking technology is employed to provide any
required physical movement by using a living actor as a body double."6 In
addition, a dead celebrity's voice is supplied in various ways, such as by a
digital compilation of spoken words extracted from the soundtracks of
155. LORD OF THE RINGS (New Line Cinema 2002); see Jamie Painter Young, The Race is
On: This Year the Performances Were Often Stronger Than the Movies-Which Should Make the
SAG Actor Awards All the More Competitive, 43 BACK STAGE, Dec. 20, 2002 (describing the
process by which Serkis' performance was digitally captured, subsequently animated, and edited
into the story as the lizard-like character that audiences see on the screen and the dilemma of
whether or not Serkis should be eligible for a best supporting actor award).
156. See Smith, supra note 150, at 304-05 (featuring Jude Law and discussing his roles and
the cast of Sky Captain).
157. Id. at 305.
158. See, e.g., Young, supra note 155; Kehr, supra note 28.
159. See Kehr, supra note 28.
160. See Beard, supra note 10, at 462-63.
161. See Introduction to Photogrammetry, at
http://www.univie.ac.at/Luftbildarchiv/wgv/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
162. See Beard, supra note 10, at 463.
163. See Nadia Magnenat Thalmann & Pascal Volino, Sculpting, Clothing and Hairdressing
Our Virtual Humans, in INTERACTIVE COMPUTER ANIMATION 205, 206 (Nadia Magnenat
Thalmann & Daniel Thalmann eds., 1996).
164. See Beard, supra note 31, at 117.
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archival movie footage, or by an impersonator who mimics the celebrity's
voice. 165 Therefore, a deceased actor's virtual persona is a combination of
separate digital components. By contrast, a living actor's clone is directly
created by digitizing his or her entire performance-body, face, voice, hair,
emotional response, and movements.
B. Persona and the Law
All performers, including actors, musicians, singers, dancers, models,
or sports figures are entitled to the economic value of their performances.
166
However, a performer's persona is defined by an identifiable image and is
conceptually separate from, although often inextricably linked to,
performance. Differences in the identifiability of performers result in a
gradation of commercial value ranging from non-celebrity performers with
little commercial value outside their own performances to star performers
whose personas wield separate and independent commercial leverage.
Although celebrity is an almost impossible label to define, generally, the
more celebrity an actor enjoys, the higher the actor's commercial value.
All actors are protected against an unauthorized use of their identities
for advertising purposes, 167 but some postmodern authors argue that a
celebrity actor's persona should be part of the public domain because, as an
inherently derivative cultural icon, a celebrity actor's persona is a shared
creation. 168  The argument is that iconic status relies as much upon
audience perception and support as upon the performer's skill and hard
165. See David Ansen, Send Back the Clowns, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 73.
166. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Co. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (giving plaintiff
performer exclusive right to his act or "entire performance"); see generally Melville B. Nimmer,
The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) (stating that because individuals
have a natural right to enjoy the fruits of their labor, they are also entitled to protect the value of
their publicity).
167. See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 1998) (using a
baseball player's image in a printed advertisement); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d
407, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1996) (using a basketball player's former name in an automobile
commercial aired on television); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th
Cir. 1992) (using a game-show hostess's identity in a printed advertisement). Cf Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-86 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the article's
use of an altered photograph of plaintiff was not purely commercial and thus was protected by the
First Amendment).
168. See Vincent M. de Grandpre, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic
Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 74-75
(Autumn 2001); see also Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127 (1993) (rejecting the Lockean Labor Theory
justification for the right of publicity because celebrities do not create their own images-images
are created by a complex network of social and democratic factors).
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work. 169 As such, it should be part of the marketplace of ideas, which
enjoys First Amendment protection. 17  Various legal theories, including
statutory and common law right of publicity, copyright and trademark law,
and unfair competition (the Lanham Act)' 7 ' have been applied in an effort
to balance a performer's primarily economic interests with the public's
interest in free expression. At least one commentator has suggested that
applicable legislation should be based on moral rights. 72  In any case,
under current law, the inevitable impasse centers on two issues: (1) whether
an unauthorized use of an actor's persona is constitutionally protected by
the First Amendment freedom of expression or is a violation of a
performer's proprietary right to control and exploit his or her image, and
(2) the correlative distinction between constitutionally protected speech and
commercial speech.
C. The Constitutional Quagmire
1. Overview of the First Amendment Defense
The two distinct, commonly acknowledged purposes of the First
Amendment are (1) to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas and
repel efforts to limit the "'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on
public issues,"'17 3 and (2) "to foster a 'fundamental respect for individual
development and self-realization."",174  However, there is an inherent
tension between protecting a performer's right to commercially exploit his
or her persona and insuring a free flow of ideas and creativity for the
public's benefit. 175 The only semi-certainty in legal decisions regarding
this inherent conflict is the judicial and jurisdictional distinction between
commercial speech and noncommercial speech. Noncommercial speech,
169. See Giacoppo, supra note 26, at 622.
170. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46
cmt. b (1995) ("[C]elebrities are not precluded from establishing cognizable injury to personal
interests in addition to commercial loss, nor are less well-known plaintiffs precluded from
establishing commercial loss in addition to injury to personal interests .... ).
172. See Beard, supra note 31, at 191 (calling for a sui generis moral rights law).
173. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001)
(citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979).
174. Id.
175. See Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156) ("Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.").
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including parody,176 even if false or misleading, is generally protected by
First Amendment freedom of expression. 177 Thus, any statute restricting
noncommercial speech receives strict constitutional scrutiny, and,
consequently, the statute will generally be held as unconstitutional.
78
Conversely, statutes regarding commercial speech receive only rational-
basis (the lowest level) scrutiny, which means commercial speech can be
regulated, and false or misleading commercial speech is generally
prohibited.
79
In an attempt to remedy the constitutional conflict, many right of
publicity statutes, such as California Civil Code section 3344(d), have
expressly incorporated protective First Amendment provisions. 180 Section
3344(d) states that "[F]or purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public
affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not
constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).''
Other states' right of publicity statutes offer various and sometimes
substantially different categorical protections, 182 but, with few exceptions,
"right of publicity claims have been denied when use was made of a
person's identity in books, newspapers, magazine articles, on television or
radio shows, in films or plays, and sometimes in advertising incidental to
such permitted uses."' 
83
Professor McCarthy describes a three-part hierarchy of speech,
84
which has varying levels of constitutional protection. The first two levels
of speech receive the highest level of constitutional protection. At the top
176. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Player's Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th
Cir. 1996) (asserting that the parodic baseball trading cards are not commercial speech, but "[a]n
important form of entertainment and social commentary that deserve First Amendment
protection."); see generally F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The
"Transformativeness " Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity
Claim Against Distribution of a Work ofArt, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 44-53 (2003) (describing
different arguments for levels of scrutiny and right of publicity laws).
177. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); see also Kasky v.
Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002).
178. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65.
179. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770-71 (1976) (stating that untruthful speech has never been protected).
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2004).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Zacchini 433 U.S. at 562; Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.N.J. 1981).
183. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 52; see, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d
829, 834-36 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
184. MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 8.13.
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is news or "information about the real world., 185 Next are stories of fiction
and entertainment. At the bottom is advertising, which receives, at best,
limited constitutional protection. 186  However, the "hazy line between
commercial and non-commercial speech does not separate valuable speech
from worthless speech,"'187 as "[a]dvertising has a long tradition in this
country as an important means of expression."' 188 Thus, the Supreme Court
has held that commercial speech can be constitutionally protected. 89
2. Noncommercial Versus Commercial Speech
"The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
within a single medium seems particularly arbitrary."' 90 For example, a
right of publicity claim may be brought against the makers of a television
commercial but not against the program the commercial endorses.' 9'
Therefore, whether a First Amendment defense for an unauthorized use of
an actor's persona will prevail over a right of publicity claim turns on the
dispositive, although nebulous, issue of how a specific jurisdiction will
classify the media work containing the virtual actor-as commercial,
expressive, or some combination of the two. The problem for actors is that
since there is no federal statute governing this issue, jurisdictions have
created their own balancing tests for distinguishing expressive from
commercial speech, resulting in a patchwork of judicially subjective
decisions.
192
185. Id.
186. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65; Kasky, 45 P.3d at 251.
187. See Kaplan, supra note 85, at 55.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S., 748,
761-62 (1976)).
190. Kaplan, supra note 85, at 59.
191. Id.
192. See Gibeaut, supra note 133, at 49 ("In the resulting hybrid jurisprudence, judges
weave property rights and First Amendment principles with concepts borrowed from related, yet
distinct, copyright law. Sometimes judges appear to engage in constitutionally prohibited
evaluations of content.").
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3. Definitions of Commercial Speech
Drawing the line between commercial and noncommercial speech has
been accurately described as a "'notoriously unstable and contentious
domain of First Amendment jurisprudence' that is 'currently in
confusion."' 193 The Supreme Court has steadfastly declined to create a
bright-line rule to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech and
has generally chosen to apply the "common sense" test on a case-by-case
basis. 194 This is because, as Justice Stevens stated, "[w]e must be wary of
unnecessary insistence on rigid classifications, lest speech entitled to
'constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed.'"" 95
The newsworthy approach was developed through cases involving
non-advertising news and entertainment works. 19 6 Under this approach, if
content is used because of its newsworthy quality, the court will not
consider it to be a use for "purposes of trade" and it will be constitutionally
protected speech.' 97  Use of persona in news, public affairs, sports
broadcast or its account, or any political campaign is often expressly
exempted in states' right of publicity law. 98 However, later decisions
generally held that "non-informational entertainment media works are also
speech privileged against appropriation privacy and publicity claims
without requiring a showing of newsworthiness."' 99
Since the Supreme Court gave First Amendment protection to purely
commercial speech for the first time in the 1976 case of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2 °° the
trend has been to expand the constitutional protection of truthful
commercial speech. Courts have created various categorical definitions
and tests to try to balance society's need for a free exchange of ideas with
the economic interests of individuals.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the
193. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 664.
194. See N.Y. Publ. Interest Research Group v. Ins. Info. Inst., 531 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1010-11
(N.Y. 1988).
195. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983).
196. See MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 6.86.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d).
199. Dougherty, supra note 176, at 6 (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603
P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979); see also Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
200. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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economic interests of the speaker and its audience., 20 1 In 1983, the
Supreme Court made its only attempt to define commercial speech in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. ,202 stating that commercial speech
is "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction.' 20 3 The Bolger test for commercial speech has three factors:
(1) the speech is an advertisement, (2) that refers to specific products, and
(3) the speaker is economically motivated.0 4
The California Supreme Court, in Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,20 5 developed its
own three-part test for commercial speech which includes these factors: (1)
the message in question is directed by a commercial speaker, (2) to a
commercial audience, and (3) the representations are made primarily to sell
the speaker's products. 0 6 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, after initially
granting certiorari, dismissed the Kasky case, and thereby "passed on the
chance to clarify an area of the law that has been riddled with doctrinal
incoherence for some time.
20 7
As the above tests illustrate, the balancing approaches used to
distinguish noncommercial from commercial speech are conceptually
general and inherently subjective, thus making them unpredictable and
inconsistent. By way of illustration, the opinions in White v. Samsung
Electronics American, Inc. 208 and Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
20 9
show inconsistencies exist even within the same jurisdiction. In the former
case, the defendant created a commercial featuring a robot resembling
Vanna White and placed the robot in the context of a game show that
simulated the program in which White appeared, Wheel of Fortune.210 The
Ninth Circuit chose not to accept a parody defense and found a common
law infringement of Vanna White's economic interests. On the other hand,
the Ninth Circuit held that an actual picture of Dustin Hoffman as Tootsie
in a pictorial in Los Angeles Magazine featuring then-current fashions by
various designers was not an "advertisement printed merely for the purpose
of selling a particular product., 21' The court adopted a merger-type
201. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
202. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 66-67.
205. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002).
206. Id.
207. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 665.
208. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
209. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
210. See White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
211. Hoffinan, 255 F.3d at 1185.
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approach and explained that "commercial aspects are 'inextricably
entwined' with expressive elements, and so they cannot be separated out
'from the fully protected whole."' 212 Because "common sense" told the
court that the article, which had very little editorial content, was "not a
simple advertisement," the court treated the article on the whole as
noncommercial speech. 13 Contrary to the result in White, the court found
the use of the picture amounted to a non-infringement of Hoffman's
economic interests. The court's interpretation of the fashion pictorial
resulted in First Amendment protection for the magazine article even
though Hoffman's image may have sold magazines.21 4
The balancing analysis has become progressively complicated as
more and more advertising is mixed, or blended, speech-meaning it
contains both noncommercial and commercial components. 215  Motion
pictures, for example, have become veritable billboards in the past
decade,216 as product placement is being used more and more by advertisers
who are scrambling to maintain exposure in today's competitive media
environment.217 Hence, the commercial versus noncommercial/expressive
distinction has become progressively attenuated as "Hollywood is more
interested in producing feature length advertisements than in making
films. ' 21 8  In illustration, consider Carina Chocano's review of National
Treasure, a recently released Walt Disney film starring Nicolas Cage.21 9
Chocano wrote that National Treasure:
Has all the soul, wit and originality of a major co-branding
212. Id. (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d
1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990).
213. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186.
214. Id.
215. See MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 8.97; Symposium, Welcome to the World of
Advertainment, 2004 INSTITUTE ON ENTERTAINMENT LAW & BUSINESS, Sept. 18, 2004, at
section 7 (on file with author); C.C. Laura Lin, Corporate Image Advertising and the First
Amendment, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 459, 459-60 (1988) (citing the "phenomenal upsurge in corporate
image advertising" and how it fails to fit into the two traditional speech categories). But see
hite, 971 F.2d at 1401 (denying a First Amendment parodic defense, and holding that "[t]he
difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off is the difference between fun and profit"). See
generally Kasky, 45 P.3d at 243 (showing there are contrary commercial versus noncommercial
holdings, which were based on similar factual issues).
216. See William Benjamin Lackey, Comment, Can Lois Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An
Examination of the Constitutionality of Regulating Product Placement in Movies, 1993 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 275, 275 (1993) (arguing, generally, that product placement, whether paid or unpaid,
constitutes commercial speech as defined by the Supreme Court).
217. See id. at 276-77.
218. Id. at 275.
219. See Carina Chocano, Bankrupt 'National Treasure': The Bruckheimer Bombast Knocks
This Hunt for Loot OffCourse, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at El.
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campaign, [and]... its prodigious marketing effort overwhelms
'National Treasure,' and not just because of its impressive
number of promotional tie-ins. (McDonald's, Verizon, Visa,
Kodak, Dodge and NASCAR are part of the cross-promotion, as
are the cities of Washington and Philadelphia.) The movie is just
too willing to veer off into memorable merchandising
moments.220
Furthermore, journalism and entertainment are becoming more and
more intertwined as ratings-conscious media executives and producers try
to find ways to keep the audience interested and away from the dreaded
remote control button. For example, some local television news programs
regularly spend a significant portion of their broadcast minutes promoting
their parent network's entertainment programming, as if it is
newsworthy. 221  Thus, the line between commercial and noncommercial
speech has become steadily more, and not less, distinct.
D. Battle of the Balancing Tests
1. The Relatedness Test
The Restatement of Unfair Competition authorizes the use of an
individual's name or identity in a work that is "related to that person.,
222
Permissible related uses include:
The use of a person's name or likeness in news reporting,
whether in newspapers, magazines, or broadcast news ... use in
entertainment and other creative works, including both fiction
and nonfiction . . . use of a celebrity's name or photograph as
part of an article published in a fan magazine or in a feature
story broadcast on an entertainment program ... dissemination
of an unauthorized print or broadcast biography ... [and] [u]se
of another's identity in a novel, play, or motion picture. 3
The relatedness test stems from the rationale that "celebrities take on
public meaning, [and] the appropriation of their likenesses may have
important uses in uninhibited debate on public issues, particularly debates
220. Id.
221. Local Los Angeles CBS affiliate, CBS2 News, often promotes network entertainment
programming such as Survivor and other shows as part of the newscast, rather than in traditional
promotional advertising during commercial breaks.
222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995).
223. Id.
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about culture and values., 224 Celebrities are important communicative and
expressive resources in our culture, and the right of publicity "has the
potential of censoring significant expression by suppressing alternative
versions of celebrity images that are iconoclastic, irreverent, or otherwise
attempt to redefine the celebrity's meaning., 225 The relatedness inquiry
thus helps insure that there is no shield against biography, caricature,
226parody, and satire.
2. The Transformativeness Test
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. ,227 the plaintiff
was the registered owner of all the rights to the Three Stooges, and sued
artist/entrepreneur Gary Saderup when Saderup sold lithographs and T-
shirts bearing the comedy trio's likeness. 228 Saderup claimed the First
Amendment provided his defense, and the California Supreme Court
developed a new balancing test by which to gauge whether or not an
infringing work infused enough creative input, or transformative value, to
convert the work into something more than a mere imitation of the Three
Stooges' likeness.22 9  "[T]he California Supreme court attempted to
develop a middle ground-a categorical test under which some art would
be fully protected speech under the First Amendment but other art would
be treated as mere merchandise., 230 The court's concern was that if all
exploitations, such as Mr. Saderup's, were constitutionally protected, an
"enormous source of celebrity wealth recognized for decades would be
lost."' 23' Yet to absolutely deny First Amendment protection for the
creation and rendering of artistic works would be inconsistent with
substantial Supreme Court precedent.232 Under the California Supreme
Court's transformativeness test, which was taken from the fair use doctrine
in copyright law, 233 if the work contains significant transformative elements
and does not derive its value primarily from the underlying protected work
(such as the Three Stooges' fame) it must be accorded First Amendment
224. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Comedy III Prods, 21 P.3d at 797.
228. See id. at 800-01.
229. See id. at 801.
230. See Dougherty, supra note 176, at 28.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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234protection. Here, again, judges determine what is "significant
transformativeness" by using a relatively subjective balancing process in
order to distinguish art from advertising.
In Comedy III, the California Supreme Court used Andy Warhol as an
example of an artist whose work transcends a celebrity's image and
deserves First Amendment protection,235 whereas Saderup's creative
efforts, although recognized as expressive work, were held to contain "no
significant transformative or creative contribution.2 36  Thus, Saderup's
work was not protected by the First Amendment.237 On the other hand, the
Sixth Circuit Court, citing with approval the dissent in White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.,238 the holding in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc.,239 and the transformative test used in Comedy III,240 found for the
defendant publishing company in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing.24' The
defendant company was selling hundreds of reproductions of an art print
entitled "The Masters of Augusta," by artist Rick Rush, which showed
pictures of the famous golf course, centered around a painting of Tiger
Woods, the famous golfer. The plaintiff, the exclusive licensing agent for
Woods, alleged various violations, including trademark infringement, false
advertising under the Lanham Act, unfair competition, right of publicity
under Ohio common law, and others. The Sixth Circuit held that Rush's
work is expression that has sufficient transformative elements to be entitled
to the full protection of the First Amendment.242 Comedy III and ETW
Corp., in two different jurisdictions, show how subjective and potentially
arbitrary the commercial versus noncommercial distinction can be.
The fair use doctrine, on which the transformativeness test is based, is
vague and unpredictable,243 and courts tend to focus on one or more
(generally only one) of the non-exclusive factors described in the copyright
statute. Therefore, "[fair use] has not done a good job prescriptively or
normatively in copyright, ' 244 and it is not reasonable to expect courts
234. See Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 808.
235. Id. at 811 (Andy Warhol, a modem artist whose craft was developed in advertising,
often used celebrity images such as Marilyn Monroe in his artwork.).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992).
239. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2000).
240. See Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 797.
241. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (N.D. Ohio 2000), aff'd 332 F.3d
915 (6th Cir. 2003).
242. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937-38.
243. See MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 8.39.
244. See Dougherty, supra note 176, at 28.
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applying the transformativeness test to fare any better, or any more
consistently.
3. The Predominant Purpose Test
In the latest twist in this constitutional quagmire, the Missouri
Supreme Court, in Doe v. TCI Cablevision,245 rejected both the relatedness
and the transformative tests246 and adopted its own "predominant use" test:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual's identity, that product should
be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by
the First Amendment, even if there is some '"expressive"'
content in it that might qualify as "'speech"' in other
circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant purpose
of the product is to make an expressive comment on or about a
celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater weight.247
In a clear showing of concern for protecting actors' and other artists'
rights, the court rejected the relatedness and transformative tests, which
"operate to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name and
identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its commercial
exploitation,, 248 because "they give too little consideration to the fact that
many uses of a person's name and identity have both expressive and
commercial components. 49
Doe v. TCI Cablevision involved defamation and misappropriation
claims brought by the professional hockey player Tony Twist against the
creator of the comic book Spawn because it contained a character sharing
Twist's name and characteristics and was marketed primarily to hockey
fans. The defendant asserted a First Amendment defense, but the court,
applying its predominant purpose test, held that the "use and identity of
Twist's name has become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and
related products rather than an artistic or literary expression, and under
these circumstances, free speech must give way to the right of publicity. 2s °
Doe v. TCI Cablevision implies that unauthorized usage of a
celebrity's image associated with a particular demographic market may tip
245. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W. 3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
246. Id. at 374.
247. Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of
Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 471, 488-98 (2003)).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
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the balancing analysis toward a determination that it is advertising, rather
than speech that deserves First Amendment protection. However, the
predominant purpose test seems at least as subjective as any other
balancing test for commercial speech. It still depends upon a subjective,
even if well-reasoned, balancing analysis that necessarily attempts to
determine the state of mind of the creator-defendant, and possibly an
aesthetic distinction between art and commerce. Based on its decisions in
Zacchini 251 and TCI Cablevision,252 what seems clear is that courts are
currently supportive of artists' economic rights when producers try to
enrich themselves at artists' expense. 53 In any case, the battle of the
balancing tests will most likely continue.
IV. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
Under current law, "when an actor's image and voice are captured on
film, two sets of rights are involved: (1) the actor's rights in his or her
image and performance; and (2) the copyright of the film. 254 Even though
the rights of actors and producers have been well-litigated, digital virtual
actors are "uncharted territory. 255  Performance capture technology
produces a digital blueprint of an actor that can be stored, reused,
manipulated, and duplicated in any imaginable way. Reanimation will thus
require courts to apply the predominant purpose, transformativeness,
common sense, or some balancing test to moving expressions of actors in
motion pictures or digital works. These works involve "multiple
256 rdt hexpressions" by actors, compared to the still photographs or paintings
illustrated in Hoffman, Comedy III, or ETW. Hence, courts will have to
first determine such issues as whether or not the source-actor is, and
therefore owns, the actor's virtual clone.
251. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
252. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W. 3d. at 363.
253. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Screen Actor's Guild, Inc., supra note 39 at 8-9.
254. See Beard, supra note 10, at 451.
255. Id. at 452.
256. See Briefof Amicus Curiae Screen Actor's Guild, Inc., supra note 39, at 12-13.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
A. Copyright
1. The Source-Actor is an Idea
Under copyright law, a source-actor cannot be copyrighted,257 but any
scanned clone of the source-actor will be a copyrightable recording.258 The
fixation requirement is satisfied when the digital data is recorded and stored
into memory by a computer.259 Copyright, however, only protects works
that contain some modicum of creativity. 260 Therefore, under current legal
theory, courts may have to determine whether or not simply scanning a
living actor, or digitally recreating a dead actor, meets the minimum level
of creativity necessary to give a producer authorship. In performance
capture, a digital scandata-set 261 is created when a source-actor is scanned
while wearing a body suit covered with sensors which reflect light in order
to read the actor's exact dimensions.2 62 The scanning procedure is akin to
Xerox copying and creates a mere likeness of the source-actor. Therefore,
the resulting scandata-set may not reach the level of creativity required
under copyright law. 263 The basic virtual actor/scandata-set is conceptually
and aesthetically different from a conventional photograph, because other
than the actor's image or skeletal performance, or both, all artistic elements
such as lighting, costumes, setting, and even other actors, are subsequently
added in the computer. 264 Arguably then, the scandata-set is simply a mere
likeness of the source-actor. Also, if a posed actor (meaning one who is
arguably not performing at all) is scanned, the resulting scandata-set is
even less likely to meet the minimal required threshold of creativity.265 It is
257. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 1.01[B][1][c] (stating that a persona cannot be a writing
by an author).
258. See generally 17 U.S.C § 102 (2000) (HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1476 within this section
describes the subject matter, the general distinction between ideas and expression of ideas, and
the fixation requirement, including that it "makes no difference what the form, manner, or
medium of fixation may be").
259. Id.
260. Id. ("This [copyright originality] standard does not include requirements of novelty,
ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright
protection to require them."); see also NIMMER, supra note 79, § 2.01 [B].
261. I use this term to mean the recorded digital data that comprises a virtual actor.
262. See Kehr, supra note 28; see, e.g., Eyetronics - Experts in High Resolution Textured
3D Scanning, at http://www.eyetronics.com.
263. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 2.01 [A] (even a fine artist who fails to create a
"distinguishable variation" from a Rembrandt painting is not an author.).
264. See generally Beard, supra note 10, at 454-55 (discussing how a typical virtual
actor/scandata-set is created).
265. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 2.01[A] (stating that "similarity as is due to copying...
suffices to establish copyright infringement").
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interesting to note that under the Federal Rules of Evidence 1001(3), "[i]f
data [is] stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output
readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an 'original.',,
266
Thus, Rule 1001(3) may support the idea that a virtual clone is a mere
likeness of the source-actor-a copy of the original expression. Therefore,
if the source-actor is deemed to be an original expression, the virtual clone
is a derivative work.267 On the other hand, at least with a posed source-
actor (but conceptually applicable to all virtual clones), the scandata-set
may not be sufficiently creative enough to be copyrightable to begin with.
In other words, the specific performance by the source-actor via her virtual
clone will be copyrightable, but the latent scandata-set, which is capable of
unlimited performances, may not be.
Additionally, if the scandata-set of a source-actor is not sufficiently
creative to warrant copyright protection, it will be "an orphan if not granted
database protection" under the law.268 Unlike in Europe, there is currently
no federal database protection law in the United States.269
In any case, unless the source-actors have commissioned their own
scans, they will probably be employees of the producer, and thus they may
not be considered the author of their own clones. 270 By analogy, if a
professional photographer takes an actor's picture, the photographer
generally owns the copyright and duplication rights. Similarly, either the
owner of the scanner, or the producer who pays for the scan, will be
considered the original author and copyright owner of a source-actor's
virtual clone.2 7' Therefore, in order to prevent subsequent unauthorized
performances by their virtual clones, source-actors will have to bargain for
ownership of their own scandata-sets, which is a doubtful prospect unless
the actors have some degree of economic leverage. If the copyright owner
refuses to bargain, or the source-actors cannot afford to buy their clones, an
owner/producer may be entitled to use the virtual clones for an unlimited
number of subsequent unauthorized original performances. Consequently,
digital cloning may substantially increase the number of unauthorized
usages of a source-actor's persona in digital media works.
In order to protect the source-actors from subsequent unauthorized
usages of their digital clones, even if the original use was authorized, it is
266. FED. R. Evmo. 100 1(3) (2000).
267. See generally NIMMER, supra note 79, § 2.01[A] (describing a derivative work as one
that flows from and owes to an original copyrighted work).
268. See Beard supra note 10, at 456.
269. Id. at 455.
270. Id. at 453.
271. Id.
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crucial to determine: (1) whether or not the original digital data-the
virtual clone-is property, (2) who owns it if it is property, and (3) if there
are any restrictions on the owner's use.2 72
2. The Source-Actor Is an Expression
The Supreme Court in Zacchini expressly held rights of publicity are
analogous to copyright and patent law.2 73 Since a virtual actor is the mere
likeness of a source-actor, each digital clone is just as unique as its source-
actor is unique in the human population.2 74  As such, a source-actor's
"name and likeness may encompass a range of expression that nonetheless
falls within a protected image. 275
In fact, any dichotomy between free expression of ideas or facts,
as opposed to protectable forms of expression, collapses through
the personhood of an actor. An actor's ability to become the
physical manifestation of an idea is the essence of the actor's
craft. It is this ability to project ideas or a particular sensibility
through an image, likeness or voice that in large measure
provides performers with their value as commercial icons.276
Therefore, one approach is to deem each source-actor to be a unique
particularized expression or set of expressions of a universal idea.277 Under
current copyright law, if a source-actor in the reanimation context is
deemed to be an expression (or multiple expressions) of an idea,278 then
the virtual clone is a derivative work.27 9 Assuming that to be true, even if a
producer owns a source-actor's bargained-for performance in a particular
copyrighted film, the producer cannot use the source-actor's virtual clone
for subsequent original performances without the source actor's
authorization. 280  Conversely, if the producer owns the source-actor's
virtual clone, including all potential original performances, the producer
will have much less incentive to consider the economic or dignitary
interests of the source-actor, especially the non-celebrity source-actor.
272. Id. at 452.
273. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
274. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Screen Actor's Guild, Inc., supra note 39, at 12-13
(citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572).
275. Id. at 12.
276. Id. at 19.
277. Id. at 12-13.
278. Id. at 13.
279. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 3.01 (defining a derivative work as one that flows from,
and owes to, an original copyrighted work).
280. Id.
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Under the approach discussed above, source-actors control their own
virtual clones as authors would a copyright or inventors would a patent.
This enables source-actors to protect their personas from potentially
rampant unauthorized usages of their virtual selves, while also leaving
producers free to create new works using virtual actors they license or
contract for. This approach thus embodies copyright and patent law's
rationale, which strives to encourage creativity for the public's benefit
while preserving the economic interest of authorship. 81
B. Right of Publicity: The Entire Performance
In Zacchini, the Court held that a producer is not protected by the
First Amendment where the producer usurps an artist's "entire
performance, '' 282 even in the newsworthy context.
Hugo Zacchini's "human cannonball" performance can be categorized
as a stunt act, which is conceptually different from that of an actor such as
Tom Hanks, whose face the audience pays to see and whose performance
changes according to each specific character he creates. A human
cannonball act has relatively exact dimensions in time, activity, and
predictability, and does not necessarily require personality or sensibility to
perform. It is mechanical in nature, indefinitely repeatable, and it is
intended to work the same every time. Thus, at least in the stunt-act
context, the Court thought that if an audience saw Zacchini's entire act on a
television newscast, there could be a disincentive to subsequently pay to
see it in person. 83
However, it is arguable that the Zacchini decision is still unclear on
what the analogous protectable "entire performance" is in the context of a
non-stunt actor such as Tom Hanks. Certainly, an entire film starring
Hanks cannot be shown without authorization, but the balancing process
regarding the performances of non-stunt actors has been based on a "fair
use" or other type of analysis, which determines how much of an actor's
performance can be used without authorization. Therefore, in order to
determine the First Amendment or fair use issues, or both, the threshold
question is: "What does 'entire performance' mean regarding the
performance of a non-stunt actor?"
One way to protect actors, including celebrities, is to extend the
Court's concept of "entire performance" to include the actors
281. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 1.03[A].
282. See Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
283. Id.
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themselves. 284 If a non-stunt actor's ability to "project ideas... through an
image, likeness or voice that... provides performers with their value as
commercial icons,' '285 is conceptually analogous to a stunt-actor's "entire
performance," then any performance by the non-stunt actor's virtual clone
is protected by Zacchini. Thus, the non-stunt actor is entitled to authorize
all performances by his virtual clone and a balancing analysis can be
employed to address First Amendment concerns. As with copyright
analysis, this "entire performance" approach puts source-actors in the best
position to protect against the potentially unlimited, unauthorized, and
uncompensated misappropriation of their skills and personas286 in digital
works.
C. The Hybrid Approach
As previously described, it is not clear what the legal implications of
ownership of the copyrightable scandata-set/virtual clone will be. For
example, if a source-actor is considered to be an idea and not an expression
of an idea, then it is not clear if the copyright owner of the virtual clone
will be legally entitled to use the scandata-set for future original
performances. However, a virtual clone can be defined as an inextricably
intertwined combination of a person and that person's copyrightable
expressions. 28' As such, a virtual actor is arguably a new legal concept
requiring a new analytical approach under current law. But, as Justice
Cardozo noted, "[t]he reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of
antitheses, the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of
law. 288
If a virtual clone is a conceptual hybrid of idea and expression, then it
cannot be analyzed under the idea/expression dichotomy, 289 which is one of
the essential principles and conceptual differences that separates right of
publicity from copyright rationale.29 ° Virtual clones complicate traditional
284. See Beard, supra note 10, at 479 (stating that "the digital clone of an actor is a
combination of a representation of the person and the person himself').
285. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Screen Actors Guild, Inc., supra note 39, at 19.
286. Id. at 1, 9 (skills and persona are generally developed through much personal effort,
time, and training).
287. See supra note 284 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating "commercial aspects are 'inextricably
entwined' with expressive elements, and so they cannot be separated out from the 'fully protected
whole"').
288. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 1.10[A].
289. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 1.01 [B][2] (describing the idea/expression dichotomy).
290. See Dougherty, supra note 176, at 33 ("This important legal doctrine [the
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analysis because a copyrighted virtual clone represents not just one specific
copyrightable performance; it literally contains all potential performances
by its source-actor. This goes beyond the scope of copyright concerns
because copyright law was generally meant to apply to only one original or
derivative expression at a time, but a copyrighted virtual actor literally
contains unlimited latent original expressions. Similarly, a typical right of
publicity case involves possible infringement in only one work at a time.
But with a copyrighted virtual clone, a decision of non-infringement of
right of publicity may arguably apply to all potential performances by that
copyrighted clone. In any case, both right of publicity and copyright
protection are inextricably intertwined in the hybrid virtual clone.
Assuming this to be true, source-actors may thus be protected against
subsequent unauthorized usages of their personas in at least two ways.
First, if a source-actor is considered an expression or multiple expressions
of an idea (as argued by the Screen Actors Guild),29' then the virtual clone
is a derivative copyright,292 and any future performance by the virtual clone
would require the source-actor's authorization.293 On the other hand, if the
virtual clone is not derivative but instead deemed to be an original
copyrighted work, then the source-actor should still be protected by right of
publicity in subsequent performances by the virtual clone.
Therefore, when the idea/expression dichotomy disappears and the
virtual clone represents both the right of publicity and copyright protection
inextricably intertwined, the source-actors' personas are protected by
principles of copyright, right of publicity, or possibly both, at every step of
reanimation. If a producer argues that right of publicity is not triggered in
subsequent original performances by the copyrighted hybrid clone because
federal copyright law preempts right of publicity, 294 the counter-argument
is that the traditional rules apply only to the original bargained-for
performance, and not to potential future unlimited latent expressions.
Arguing that the owner of a copyrighted virtual clone is entitled to
unlimited original expressions by the copyrighted scandata-set is analogous
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright] has no analogue in the right of publicity
jurisprudence .... ).
291. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Screen Actors Guild, Inc., supra note 39, at 13.
292. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 3.01.
293. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (stating the robots in Cheers-themed bars were derivative works and actors do not
lose the right to control commercial exploitation of likenesses, via common law right of publicity,
by portraying fictional characters).
294. The preemption issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, for a general
overview of the issue, see Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 657 (describing the preemption
issues with right of publicity and stating that there is a split of Circuit courts on preemption).
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to stating that an owner of a copyrighted song has proprietary ownership of
all subsequent original songs by that composer containing those musical
notes.
Furthermore, giving producers proprietary ownership over any
subsequent performance by a source-actor's virtual clone may also affect a
source-actor's ability to profit from a performance.295 This is due to two
predictable reasons: (1) there may be less incentive to hire the source-actor
to perform if the producer already owns unlimited performances by the
source-actor's virtual clone, and (2) potential overexposure of the source-
actor due to unauthorized performances by the virtual clone (particularly in
undesirable subject matter) may render the source-actor less attractive to
other producers. In any case, this situation directly falls within the
definition of unjust enrichment2 96 and is contrary to the rationale behind
right of publicity and copyright.297
D. A Balancing Test for Reanimation in the Digital Age
In developed nations at least, global culture continues to shift from
primarily an aural basis to a visual digital basis.298 This transition is
reflected in the exponential rise in popularity and economic importance of
computers, the Internet, and video games.299  Presumably, when
reanimation technology matures, virtual actors will be extensively used for
the communication of ideas in both expressive and commercial works.
Right of publicity decisions have generally turned on the commercial
versus noncommercial distinction, which is embodied in various balancing
tests, such as the predominant purpose test.300 The trend has been to
expand First Amendment protection for commercial speech, but as product
placement 30' and other correlative advertising methods302 are being inserted
295. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
296. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY: SECOND POCKET EDITION 737 (2d ed. 2001) (unjust
enrichment is defined as: (1) the retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering
compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected; (2) a benefit
obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary
must make restitution or recompense).
297. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 1.03[A] (stating the purpose of copyright is to
encourage original authorship for the benefit of both the individual and society).
298. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 6.1 (6th ed. 2002) (stating that "[s]ocial
science research supports the shift from the aural and written to the visual").
299. James Schneider, The Ever-Growing Presence of Video Games in Pop Culture (Part
1), MAJOR LEAGUE GAMtNG (2005), at
http://mlgpro.com/modules.php?op-modload&name=News&file=article&sid=414 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005).
300. See supra Part III.D.3.
301. See generally Lackey, supra note 216, at 275 (arguing that product placement, whether
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more and more into expressive works, the commercial versus
noncommercial distinction will become more difficult to discern. Some
might argue that the First Amendment defense eventually should swallow
right of publicity entirely. However, recent decisions show that the
Supreme Court supports right of publicity protection of the economic value
of individuals' personas, as well as of their "entire performance[s]," even
in a newsworthy context.
303
The Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to create specific bright-
line rules for decisions involving the First Amendment.30 4 The Court has
generally applied ad hoc balancing tests on a case-by-case basis in these
scenarios. Based on past history, it is hard to imagine that the Court will
apply a definitive categorical or definitional test to reanimation scenarios.
Therefore, even with causes of action for unfair competition,3 5 the Court
will need a complex, multi-factored balancing test capable of providing
consistent and flexible analytical guidelines for reanimation scenarios
involving right of publicity and the First Amendment. Flexibility will be
necessary because reanimation cases will undoubtedly involve unlimited
nuanced combinations of such correlative issues as identifiability,30 6
substantial similarity to the source-actor,30 7 expressive versus commercial
speech considerations, fair use of virtual actors' performances in desirable
media works,30 8 and economic value of and infringement of the source-
actor's marketability. It is reasonable to believe that the analytical model
will be well-grounded in the four factors from copyright's fair use
doctrine. 30 9 The four illustrative, non-exclusive factors considered together
will provide the consistency and flexibility needed for these complex
scenarios. The four factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use;
paid or unpaid, constitutes commercial speech as defined by the Supreme Court); Symposium,
Welcome to the World of Advertainment, 2004 INSTITUTE ON ENTERTAINMENT LAW &
BUSINESS, (2004) (describing the current advertising trends today) (on file with author).
302. Id.
303. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
304. See N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Ins. Info. Inst. 531 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1010
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) ("[W]e must
be wary of unnecessary insistence on rigid classifications ... ,. quoting J. Stevens concurrence in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 579 (1980).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (listing factors for determining whether or not a mark is
famous for false endorsement analysis).
306. See MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 3.18.
307. See generally Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004)
(describing substantial similarity in music sampling); NIMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05[A][3].
308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c at 549 (1995) (stating
desirable usages include use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment,
works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses).
309. See 17 U.S.C § 107 (2000).
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the [copyrighted] work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
[copyrighted] work.310
The fair use doctrine has often been criticized, but landmark Supreme
Court decisions in 1984, 1985, and 1994 treat the equitable doctrine of fair
use at length.311 Even though the fair use inquiry has been disparagingly
characterized as "necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of
situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules,
' 312
flexibility may be necessary in the reanimation context.
1. The Right of Publicity and Copyright Share the Same Rationale
Professor Nimmer recognized that those who are strong proponents of
copyright protection may also denounce censorship. He considers this to
be a reflection of the accepted but ignored paradox that even though the
First Amendment expressly states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech," copyright law directly violates this
commandment. 3 1 3 This can be seen as the beginning of a historical chain of
competing legal theories that have tried to justify this paradox by boldly
attempting to determine which kinds of speech abridge the First
Amendment.3 14 Professor Nimmer criticizes both "ad hoc" balancing
theories and "definitional balancing" theories as being equally limited in
their ability to solve the dilemma that ensued when the American judiciary
generally decided not to accept an absolutist approach to constitutional
law.31 5 Thus, our jurisprudence contains contradictions and accepted
paradoxes, one of which may be the idea that copyright and right of
publicity are incompatible because they seek to protect different things.
31 6
It has been said that the attempt to read protection of privacy into
copyright law is mistaken because that trend evolved from an aberrational
British case of the mid-nineteenth century.317 The Lord Chancellor used
310. Id.
311. See NIMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
312. Sony, 464 U.S. at 480.
313. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
314. See NIMMER, supra note 79, § 1.10.
315. Id. § 1.10[A] (defining "ad hoc" and "definitional balancing" theories).
316. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 649 (stating that the right of publicity seeks to
protect a person's name, likeness, picture, and voice, and these associational elements are not
protected by copyright).
317. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentaries: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
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copyright law to protect Queen Victoria and Prince Albert's privacy
interest in their personal etchings against a Mr. Strange who surreptitiously
obtained copies of the etchings and wanted to publish them.318  The
Chancellor resorted to copyright law because, unlike in America, there was
no law of privacy in Britain, just as there was no strong commitment to the
protection of free speech.319 However, it is interesting to note that this
Prince Albert case, which relied on copyright principles, was "the seed
from which grew the American right of privacy, after fertilization by
Brandeis and Warren."
320
It has also been said that incorporating privacy concerns into
copyright would "burden us with a bewilderingly schizophrenic body of
law that would simultaneously seek to reveal and to conceal., 321 However,
the fact is that privacy law in the United States has steadily evolved from
protecting individuals' dignitary interests into protecting economic identity
interests via the right of publicity. 322 For example, it seems that celebrities
are not so concerned these days with their right to be left alone as much as
they are concerned with their right to the value of their personas.323 Thus,
the economic interests that right of publicity laws are designed to protect
are not that far removed from original authors' interests in copyright
rationale.
2. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The utilitarian goals of copyright and right of publicity can be seen as
conceptually closely related. For example, the first factor of the fair use
doctrine, "the purpose and character of the use, ' 324 seeks to identify
noncommercial versus commercial usages of authors' copyrighted works.
This mirrors the goal of right of publicity decisions, which is to determine
when an unauthorized usage of a persona should be discounted in favor of
freedom of expression. That line has generally been drawn between
commercial and noncommercial usages. Interestingly, courts and
commentators have analyzed the first factor in the fair use doctrine by
employing the transformative test to help determine whether or not the
1105, 1129 (1990).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1130.
322. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 647-48.
323. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001);
Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
324. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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defendant's unauthorized use of a copyrighted work qualifies for the fair
use defense.325 The fair use transformative test seems literally and
conceptually to be the same transformativeness test used in right of
publicity cases.326 The tests in both these areas of law determine whether
an unauthorized infringement of an individual's property interest, be it a
copyrighted work or an identity interest, offers society enough benefit to
allow the unauthorized use. 327 This reflects the fact that the underlying
objectives of copyright law parallel those of the First Amendment, because
"[T]he Framers intended copyright . . . to be the engine of free
,0328expression.
In any case, practically speaking, the first factor can conceptually
contain any test courts adopt for determining commercial from
noncommercial speech.329
3. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Fair use has been criticized as vague and leading to unpredictable
results in copyright.330 Also, commentators have argued that the fair use
factors should not be applied to the right of publicity because it does not
have internal mechanisms that protect the First Amendment.33 For
example, one argument is that copyright has the idea/expression
dichotomy, which provides categorical protection for First Amendment
expressive works, whereas right of publicity does not have such an internal
mechanism. 332 Virtual actors, however, as described above, conceptually
contain both idea and expression; therefore, copyright principles alone are
not sufficient. Thus, right of publicity is also implicated and a balancing
test should be applied for First Amendment issues.
Under the second fair use factor, "the nature of the copyrighted
work," the more creative a work, the more protection from copying it
should get.333 Conversely, the more informational or functional the work,
the broader the scope of the fair use defense.334 Thus, unauthorized
325. See NMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05[A].
326. See MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 8:72 n.8 (describing the fact that the transformative
test was borrowed from the fair use doctrine).
327. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
328. Leval, supra note 317, at 1135.
329. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (describing the transformativeness test); Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (describing the predominant purpose test).
330. See McCARTHY, supra note 34, § 8.38.
331. See Dougherty, supra note 176, at 31-33.
332. Id. at 32.
333. See NIMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05[AI[2][a].
334. Id.
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infringements of entertainment works are less likely to receive the fair use
defense. 335 This may also make sense for right of publicity analyses in the
reanimation context. Furthermore, I suggest an additional analytical usage
of the second factor. It may also be used to directly engage the potential
legal paradox (as well as the delicacy of analysis that may be needed) of
the proposed hybrid concept of virtual actors.
Copyright law is based on the conceptual difference and separation
between an idea and an expression of an idea.336 But, virtual actors can be
seen as both an idea and an expression simultaneously. Therefore, when
applying their ad hoc balancing tests, it may be important for courts to
"strike a balance between the dual risks created by the copyright system" 337
as well as keep in mind that a source-actor-who may be deemed to be the
"fact or idea" that cannot be copyrighted-is also contained within this
hybrid clone.
In illustration, the second factor could provide guidance in
determining whether or not a particular virtual actor/scandata-set meets the
threshold level of creativity necessary to qualify for copyright protection to
begin with. As previously described, the initial step of the "performance
capture" process is to record the source-actor first, without any other
creative elements involved.338 At this stage, the nature of the clone is just
the mere likeness of the source-actor and may not be copyrightable. This is
conceptually similar to a typical fair use analysis, since courts have
supported the fair use defense in cases involving unauthorized usages of
copyrighted material, and not in those involving uncopyrighted works.33 9
In other words, if a particular scandata-set is simply the three-dimensional
digital recording of posed source-actors, then the purpose of the scan is to
record and store their digital blueprint for future performances of any
imaginable type. Arguably, this virtual clone has not met the minimum
amount of creativity necessary for copyright protection, and can be seen as
an idea and not an expression. Thus, any subsequent unauthorized usages
of the uncopyrighted virtual clone should not get a fair use defense. As
previously stated, this argument is supported by Federal Rules of Evidence
1001(3), which says that "[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the
335. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,972 (9th Cir. 1981).
336. 17 U.S.C § 102 (2000).
337. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
338. See, e.g., Kehr, supra note 28; Turan, supra note 151.
339. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use defense is for an infringement of copyrighted works).
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data accurately, is an 'original.
''3 40
If the source-actor begins to perform and the producer begins to add
creative elements to the skeletal performance, the analysis should begin to
consider the point at which the minimum level of creativity necessary for
secondary or derivative copyrightability is reached. That decision, in turn,
will determine when the producer has an ownership claim to that specific
original performance. 34' However, under this analytical approach, the point
at which derivative or secondary copyrightability begins may also be the
point at which the source-actor's right of publicity is triggered, thereby
preventing the producer from unjust enrichment via the source-actor's
virtual persona creating unauthorized original performances.
The second factor may also prove useful when regarding the
economic value of a particular source-actor, whose marketability is
generally in direct ratio to his or her celebrity. Thus, the nature of the
source-actor's economic value will range from one of non-celebrity, where
the source-actor's only value is in his or her performance, to a star celebrity
who has great economic value even when not performing. The nature of a
particular source-actor's value, then, can be considered an illustrative
application of the second factor.
4. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Another criticism of fair use is that it does not produce predictable
results, because the factors are easily argued both ways by opposing parties
and by judges. 342 However, usually courts have relied on only one or two
of the fair use factors in their decisions, primarily because they were
deciding the commercial versus noncommercial distinction and the first and
fourth factors seemed to suffice.343 This is contrary to what the Supreme
Court has stressed, which is that all four factors should be considered
together.3" Insistence on the Court's edict will be necessary in the
reanimation context because reliance on only one or two factors will be
insufficient to cover all the nuanced issues virtual actors will create. For
example, the third fair use factor, "the amount and substantiality of the
portion used," 4  may play an important role in reanimation analyses
340. FED. R. EviD. 100 1(3) (2000).
341. See, e.g., Beard, supra note 10, at 453.
342. See NIMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05 (stating that powerful arguments exist on both
sides of each factor).
343. See Dougherty, supra note 176, at 30 (describing cases where courts have concentrated
on one or two factors and not all four).
344. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
345. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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because both copyright and right of publicity turn initially on
recognizability.
In the reanimation context, it will be necessary to determine whether
or not a virtual actor's performance is "substantially similar" enough to be
recognized as the source-actor for both right of publicity and First
Amendment decisions. Thus, along with the First Amendment versus
commercial speech distinction, reanimation will require courts to apply
their balancing approaches (or "common sense" test) to right of publicity's
identifiability346 element as well. This is because "[d]igital technology will
not only create clones of individuals, it may also be used to modify (and/or
remove) existing images., 347  This third factor from copyright can be
viewed as related to the identifiability element in right of publicity analysis.
This is because fair use in copyright determines whether or not a secondary
or derivative copyrighted work (or parts therein) is substantially similar
enough to be recognized as the same as the original copyrighted work,
348
which is analogous to recognizability of a source-actor in right of publicity
cases.
In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,49 the Ninth Circuit
found a violation of a celebrity race car driver's right of publicity from the
defendant's advertising depicting the driver's race car without the driver.
350
If identifiability can be triggered when the celebrity's image isn't shown,
351
courts will do an analogous identity determination when virtual clones are
used in digital works. If, for instance, the creator of the film chooses not to
show the source-actor's face in the virtual actor's performance, but wishes
to take advantage of the source-actor's identifiable characteristics in a
character, courts will decide if recognizable body movements, body parts,
voice inflections, identifiable tattoos, clothing worn, or other identifiable
characteristics utilized in the virtual actor's performance are substantially
similar to the source-actor. This establishes the actor's identity, thereby
triggering right of publicity implications.352 In other words, courts will
have to determine where the line of transformation past recognizable
346. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b)(1) (West 1997); see also the Screen Actors Guild basic
employment agreement (stating that "the foregoing shall apply only if the performer is
recognizable" and, as to stunts, only if the stunt is identifiable) (on file with author).
347. Beard, supra note 10, at 486.
348. See NIMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05[A][3].
349. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
350. Id. at 822.
351. Id. at 827.
352. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (stating that the
producers of the comic book Spawn were not entitled to First Amendment defense in the creation
of an animated character resembling Tony Twist, the famous hockey player).
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identity is drawn, particularly since virtual actors will have more capability
than their source-actors.
Additionally, if the clone's performance was substantial enough to be
identifiable as a source-actor, but not used in great enough proportion to the
completed whole, that may help support a court's decision to allow a First
Amendment defense and negate a right of publicity claim. Analogous to
music sampling,353 when analyzing a virtual actor scenario, courts will
sometimes have to apply a balancing analysis not only to the motion
picture itself, but also to each virtual actor's performance within the motion
picture.
The bottom line is that virtual actor scenarios will undoubtedly
contain unlimited variations of performance and gradations of
identifiability. Therefore, if a source-actor's clone has been modified, or is
only partially recognizable in the resulting digital work, this third factor
will offer a guiding principle in determining the point at which the
performance (1) becomes a separately identifiable image, thereby negating
the source-actor's right of publicity, and/or possibly negating the source-
actor's claim to future performances by the derivative, copyrighted
character; (2) remains recognizable as the source-actor, thus retaining right
of publicity protection; and (3) is substantial enough either quantitatively or
qualitatively to either negate or garner a First Amendment defense.
5. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of the
Work
Factor four, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work,, 3 54 is also conceptually the same for both
right of publicity and copyright marketability analyses involving virtual
actors. In right of publicity cases, courts may use this guideline to
determine the adverse economic impact, if any, that a virtual clone's
unauthorized performance has on the source-actor's market value.355
Potential scenarios include the dilution of economic value in a particular
market, 356 which may occur when a virtual clone's unauthorized
performance affects a celebrity's image-an image that had been carefully
353. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594-96 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing sampling
and its factors, which include substantial similarity, de minimis usage, fair use, and quantitative
and qualitative use); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir.
2004) (describing other analytical issues associated with sampling).
354. 17 U.S.C § 107 (2000).
355. See NIMMER, supra note 107, § 13.05[A][4] (describing generally how markets can be
affected).
356. See, e.g., Beard, supra note 31, at 178.
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controlled and established in previously chosen works or because the
celebrity has chosen not to endorse commercial products. 357 Conversely,
courts may also use this guideline in evaluating whether or not a celebrity's
economic value is suddenly enhanced by his clone's unauthorized
performance(s), and moves the source-actor into new markets. Sometimes,
any publicity is considered to be good publicity. Or, if non-celebrity actors
become celebrities because of their virtual clones' unauthorized
performance in an undesirable film, but the source-actors then take
economic advantage of their sudden notorious celebrity, courts can use this
factor as a useful guideline in any subsequent right of publicity or
copyright claims.
The valuation analysis may be particularly interesting in a business
environment where, for instance, source-actors are suddenly confronted
with the bizarre possibility of having to compete for jobs against their own
virtual clones. In any case, common sense tells us that unauthorized
performances by virtual clones will impact the ability of source-actors to
control their economic value in the marketplace because of overexposure or
false endorsement of their personas in the public's eye, and also because
their virtual clones' unauthorized performances may involve undesirable
subject matter. This factor, in combination with the others, will likely
cover any potential market-valuation scenarios that may arise with
reanimation.
V. CONCLUSION
When current law was written, unauthorized usages of an actor's
persona were not as easily available, changeable, duplicable, or transferable
as reanimation technology has made it today, especially when considered in
combination with the Internet. 8  Since CGI technology will reduce the
costs and geographical limitations of making films, 359 as the technology
matures it will become possible for producers to make films starring virtual
actors in a single well-equipped room anywhere in the world, especially
357. See generally Dougherty, supra note 176, at 67 (discussing the exploitation of celebrity
images).
358. See Hooray for Hollywood: Battling Piracy, Debating Vertical Integration and
Helping Stars Adjust to Changing Times-Where Else But the Entertainment Industry Can a
Lawyer Have This Much Fun?, DAILY JOURNAL EXTRA, July 19, 2004, at I 1 (one can now "press
a button, and everybody can have a [media work] copy around the world all at once."); Erin E.
Arvedlund, Hollywood Competes With the Street in Russia; To Combat Rampant DVD Piracy,
US. Film Companies Cut Prices, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2004, at El ("[P]iracy accounts for 9 out
of every 10 DVDs sold [in Russia]).
359. See Biskind, supra note 153, at 222, 224 (describing the minimalist "capture space"
and how CGI technology will reduce production costs).
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where the costs and the law are most favorable. Cutting transactional costs,
along with insuring the maximum number of future revenue streams, are
two of the most important goals for a producer. Ownership of actors'
scandata-sets will reduce production costs by eliminating the cost of hiring
actors, thereby increasing revenue and profits.
3 60
Virtual clones will predictably be used in unauthorized motion
pictures produced in states that offer the least amount of right of publicity
protection or postmortem protection, or both. They will also be used in
films made outside the United States where there is no legal protection or
where the law is unenforced. Thus, if CGI producers own or control
source-actors' virtual clones, we will have visual works producers
''asserting a right to appropriate personalities without regard to the
investment such personalities-artists in their own right-have made in
creating commercial value for such personalities, and without regard for the
personalities' wishes concerning exploitation of their image.'
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Furthermore, digital technology, especially in combination with the
Internet, is profoundly changing the world that current law is based upon.
It has the potential to change history as well, because, when this technology
matures, even expert viewers will no longer be able to tell what is real from
what is not real. Reanimation technology is creatively exciting, but there is
no consistent, reliable body of law that uniformly protects individuals
(much less actors) from unauthorized usages of their personas in the digital
context. This context includes digital imagery, modification of imagery, or
deletion of imagery in digital visual works. State law is inconsistent, or, in
some states, nonexistent.362 Digital piracy, 363 sampling, 364 and the Internet
have exposed actors and producers alike to easy and escalating abuse in the
marketplace and in culture.
The ultimate solution is the enactment of new federal law, specifically
tailored to digital technology and written with the global picture in mind,
which guarantees both a personal and proprietary right to one's persona. In
360. See Hooray for Hollywood, supra note 358, at 12 (stating that as more technology
companies partner with motion picture and television companies, problems such as lowering of
income and lack of income that has been happening in the music industry "are definitely" coming
to the motion picture and television industry as broadband rolls out).
361. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Screen Actors Guild, Inc., supra note 39, at 14.
362. See Shagin & Savare, supra note 38, at 641 (stating right of publicity exists in some
fashion in twenty-eight states).
363. See Carolyn Said, Studios to Sue Pirates: Film Industry Fights Illegal File Sharing, S.
F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2004, at CI ("Illegal movie trafficking represents the greatest threat to the
economic basis of movie-making in its 110-year history ... ").
364. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004).
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the meantime, however, several suggestions may help insure source-actors'
right of publicity in the face of reanimation. These suggestions are: (1) a
source-actor should be considered an "entire performance"; (2) a virtual
actor is a hybrid legal concept that erases the idea/expression dichotomy,
therefore, a correlative legal approach, which combines principles from
both right of publicity and copyright, should be applied; and (3) courts will
need a complex multi-factored balancing test that offers a flexible set of
guidelines for the "endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise in particular cases [which] precludes the
formulation of exact rules" in the digital world. 365
Joel Anderson
365. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62 (1976) (regarding the Copyright Act of 1976).
